(ii) P r(H = B|D) > P r(H = B| ∼ D) > 0.
government types, I omit the subscripts.
For the audience to choose M|D, it must be the case that EU A (M)|D ≥ EU A (∼ M)|D.
Rewriting the audience's expected utilities:
P r(H = A|D)u A (A) + P r(H = B|D)u A (t * 2b ) − m ≥ P r(H = A|D)u A (A) + P r(H = B|D)u A (t * 1b )
where P r(H = B|D) = λF (t * 1b −t * 2b ) λF (t * 1b −t * 2b )+(1−λ)F (0)
.
For the audience to choose ∼ M| ∼ D, it must be the case that EU A (∼ M)| ∼ D ≥ EU A (M)| ∼ D. As above, the audience's expected utilities are:
Derivations of t * 1b and t * 2b , as well as optimal policies chosen by good governments and dispute probabilities are shown in the proofs for subsequent propositions.
. Corrollary 1. In equilibrium: 
The proof follows from rearranging the first order conditions of the post-mobilization maxi-
The ratio of the audience and home government's marginal utilities matches the (inverse) ratio of their strength after mobilization. If the home government and audience's utility functions, u H and u A , were identical apart from their maximization points and were symmetrical, then the optimal policy would be an α-weighted combination of the two ideal points, t *
For instance, this would be the case if both the home government and audience held preferences represented by the often-used quadratic loss function. If the audience and the home government share the same ideal point, A = H, as in the case of a "good" government, then t * 2 = A.
Proposition 3. For a fixed initial tariff, t 1 , and, when H > A, the probability of a dispute, Π(t 1 ),
is: (i) decreasing in A, (ii) increasing in α, and (iii) decreasing in H.
Proposition 4. The home government's optimal initial policy, t *
, is: (i) increasing in A, (ii) decreasing in α, and (iii) increasing in H.
a good home government, therefore, the foreign government only initiates a dispute if it draws a negative litigation costs, i.e. it has some extraneous benefit to initiating a dispute, apart from the potential effects on home's policies. Facing a bad home government, the benefit of a dispute comes from the effect that any subsequent audience mobilization will have on changing the initial tariff policy to a new, lower final policy. If the foreign government draws a litigation cost that is higher than the benefits from changing the home government's policy, then it will not initiate a dispute.
The probability of a dispute for a particular initial policy, which I call Π(t 1 ), is the probability that the foreign government draws a low enough litigation cost that it will choose to initiate a dispute.
The home government's initial optimization problem and related first order condition are:
For a good home government, their optimal policy choice is t * 1g = A. Good home governments can do no better by choosing a different initial policy. If the foreign government draws a negative
Rewriting the FOC for the home government's maximization problem associated with t * 1 yields:
Since t * 2 is uninfluenced by t * 1 , we can rewrite the FOC as:
where h(t * 1 ) is the total derivative of the FOC with respect to t * 1 and g(t *
2 ) is the total derivative of the FOC with respect to t * 2 .
Rearranging yields:
Substituting in the total derivatives, h(t * 1 ) and g(t * 2 ) yields: 
where max(W it ) represents the largest value in the vector W it . The latent variables are modeled as a function of the k observed covariates.
X it is a 2 × k matrix of observed covariates and β is a k × 1 vector of coefficients. Σ = (σ lm ) is a positive definite 2 × 2 matrix. For identification, the model assumes that σ 11 = 1. The Bayesian approach implemented here uses the MCMC procedure developed by Imai and VanDyk (2005) to sample to sample from posterior distributions of β and Σ, based on particular prior distributions. I use very agnostic priors, where each element of β is distributed normally with mean 0 and variance
100.
1 For the main MNP model, I used a burn-in of 20,000 draws and kept every fourth draw from 70,000 subsequent draws.
2 1 Setting the prior variance to 100 means that the prior distribution is very diffuse and unlikely to influence results.
2 For the models with calendar month and age polynomials included as covariates (described below), I set the prior variance to 80, used a 15,000 draw burn-in, and kept every fourth draw from 60,000 subsequent draws.
